Controlling for labor productivity, income levels, and other possible determinants, there is a robust and statistically significant association between the extent of democracy and the level of manufacturing wages in a country. The association exists both across countries and over time within countries. The coefficient estimates suggest non-negligible wage improvements result from the enhancement of democratic institutions: average wages in a country like Mexico would be expected to increase by 10 to 40 percent were Mexico to attain a level of democracy comparable to that prevailing in the United States. Political competition and participation seem to be the driving force behind the result.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996 average labor productivity in Mexico, measured by output per worker and converted to U.S. dollars at market exchange rates, stood roughly at $9,600. The corresponding level in the United States was $58,000, six times higher. In the same year, the compensation level for production workers in the manufacturing sectors of the two countries differed by a factor of almost twelve--$1.50 per hour in Mexico versus $17.70 in the United States.
1 Why are Mexican wages so much lower than what a comparison of economy-wide labor productivities would suggest?
Cross-national comparisons of this sort are always difficult, and there could be various reasons why the wage gap is so large. The data may not be directly comparable; productivity in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors may differ; average hours worked may vary; or the presence of factors of production other than production workers may complicate the picture.
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But the size of the gap not accounted for by labor productivity is so large that one is led to suspect there may be institutional reasons for it as well. In particular, it is possible that the political context in which labor markets operate shapes behavior in these markets and influences 1 The figures on labor compensation come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and include wages, salaries, employers' contribution to social security and other labor taxes in both cases. The figures on economy-wide labor productivity are my own estimates, arrived at by adjusting GDP per-capita for labor force participation and unemployment rates. Let y, k, and u denote per-capita GDP, the labor-force participation rate for the entire population, and the unemployment rate, respectively. Then output/worker can be expressed as (1/[1-u])(1/k)y. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators 1998 CD-ROM, per-capita GDP levels at current prices and exchange rates stood at $27,676 and $3,593 in the two countries in 1996. The implied labor-force participation rates--obtained by dividing the labor force by population, both also from the same source-are 50.6 percent (United States) and 39.5 percent (Mexico). Finally, the unemployment rates in 1996 were 5.4 percent (United States) and 5.5 percent (Mexico) . Note that the Mexican unemployment rate is for urban areas only, and I have not adjusted for that.
wage outcomes. Could political institutions, as well as labor productivity, contribute to the determination of the level of wages?
The evidence marshaled in this paper strongly suggests that the answer is affirmative.
Controlling for labor productivity, income levels, and other possible determinants, there is a robust and statistically significant association between the extent of democratic rights in a country and the level of wages received by workers in manufactures. The association exists both across countries and over time within countries-that is, in panel regressions with fixed effects as well as in cross-section regressions.
The estimates suggest that non-negligible wage improvements result from the enhancement of democratic institutions. The point estimates from regressions with fixed effects imply that average manufacturing wages in Mexico would increase by a range of 6 to 38 percent were Mexico to attain a level of democracy comparable to that prevailing in the United States.
These are the "direct" effects of democracy on wages, holding constant value added per worker in manufacturing and per-capita GDP (among other controls). The cross-section regressions yield generally larger effects, with manufacturing wages in a country like Mexico expected to riseaccording to results with the most reliable data-by up to 90 percent. The evidence from past transitions to democracy is also consistent with the econometric findings: countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece have experienced increases in labor's share of manufacturing value added of several percentage points upon their transition to democracy, while countries moving in the opposite direction have typically witnessed a sharp reduction in labor's share.
We have to be careful to attribute causality in the appropriate direction when interpreting the observed association between democracy and wages. This paper provides evidence of several kinds that suggests that democracy is causal. This evidence comes from instrumental-variables estimation, panel regressions with country fixed effects, and specific instances of changes in wage levels following transitions in political regime. At the same time, it is possible that reverse causation exists as well. Countries with a large middle class-reflected in a relatively high level of manufacturing wages-may be more likely to make a transition to democracy and to remain one.
There is no obvious support in the data for this proposition, but the possibility cannot be ruled out.
The relevance of institutions to labor-market outcomes has been the subject of a number of recent papers focusing on the widening wage distribution in the United States. For example, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux [1996] focus on de-unionization and the erosion of the real value of the minimum wage as explanatory factors behind the rise in the skill premium, and the changes in the overall wage distribution more broadly. Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux [1996] study the role of "labor-market rigidities" in Canada and France relative to the United States in determining the paths of the wage distribution in these countries. Blau and Kahn [1996] emphasize the decentralized nature of wage bargaining in the U.S relative to other countries in shaping wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution. The focus on these and related papers tends to be on labor-market institutions alone, as determined by government policies or union preferences. The present paper focuses on the functional distribution of income between wages and profits, and provides evidence that the broader set of political institutions matter too.
A second strand that is relevant to this paper is the literature on the economic consequences of political democracy. Research in this area has focussed almost exclusively on the implications for economic growth, a subject on which a considerable amount has been written.
This literature has yielded generally ambiguous results; for some recent examples see Bhalla
[forthcoming], Przeworski and Limongi [1993] , Helliwell [1994] , and Barro [1996] . More recently, a number of papers have looked at the relationship between democracy and economic stability, with findings that point in the direction of a positive association [Rodrik 1997; Chandra 1998; Quinn and Woolley 1998 ]. To my knowledge, the relationship between democracy and the level of wages or other indicators of distribution has not been seriously studied.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the data on wages and indicators of democracy used in this paper. Section III presents the cross-section and time-series evidence. Section IV discusses alternative hypotheses for the finding, and carries out some tests to discriminate among them. Section V provides some concluding comments. An appendix describes data sources and construction in greater detail, paying particular attention to crossnational comparability of the wage data.
II. DATA SOURCES
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the average level of dollar wages in manufacturing. I use two sources of data on wages. One is the recently compiled World Bank Labor Market Data Base (WBLMDB, Rama [1996] ), which contains wage statistics from United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) files. This source provides information on wages per worker in manufacturing for a broad sample of countries ranging in income levels from Ethiopia (less than 300 per capita in 1985 dollars) to the United States, and going back to the early 1960s. These figures are provided in local-currency terms, and I have converted them to U.S. dollars using contemporaneous market exchange rates.
The relatively large sample size of the WBLMDB/UNIDO data set comes at some cost to cross-national comparability. In most countries, the statistics on wages refer to "wages and salaries," which in U.N. nomenclature include "all payments in cash or in kind made to 'employees' during the reference year in relation to work done for the establishment" [UNIDO 1998 ]. In principle, "wages and salaries" cover: (a) direct wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time not worked; (c) bonuses and gratuities; (d) housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer; and (e) payments in kind.
A smaller group of countries report "compensation of employees," which is "equivalent to wages and salaries plus employers' contributions on behalf of their employees paid to social security, pension and insurance schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees under these schemes and severance and termination pay" [UNIDO 1998 ]. Some countries report data that fall in between these two categories in terms of exclusiveness, by including employer contributions to social security but excluding severance pay, for example. Notes for specific countries reveal departures from standard statistical procedures in a significant number of cases.
The appendix discusses these issues in greater detail and checks for the robustness of the empirical results when controls for differences in coverage are included.
The second source of wage data is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) [Helliwell 1994; Barro 1996] .
This source provides a subjective classification of countries on a scale of 1 to 7 on civil liberties (civlib) and political rights (prights) separately, with higher ratings signifying less freedom. In practice, the country ratings on civlib and prights are highly correlated. Following Helliwell The second measure of democracy comes from the Polity III data set of Jaggers and Gurr [1995] . 6 This source contains annual democracy indicators for the period 1946-1994 for independent countries with population greater than 500,000 in the early 1990s. As with the 4 According to the BLS documentation: "Hourly direct pay includes all payments made directly to the worker, before payroll deductions of any kind, consisting of (a) pay for time worked (basic time and piece rates plus overtime premiums, shift differentials, other premiums and bonuses paid regularly each pay period, and cost-ofliving adjustments) and (b) other direct pay (pay for time not worked (vacations, holidays, and other leave, except sick leave), seasonal or irregular bonuses and other special payments, selected social allowances, and the cost of payments in kind). Social insurance expenditures and other labor taxes includes (c) employer expenditures for legally required insurance programs and contractual and private benefit plans (retirement and disability pensions, health insurance, income guarantee insurance and sick leave, life and accident insurance, occupational injury and illness compensation, unemployment insurance, and family allowances) and, for some countries, (d) other labor taxes (other taxes on payrolls or employment (or reductions to reflect subsidies), even if they do not finance programs that directly benefit workers, because such taxes are regarded as labor costs)."
Freedom House data, these indicators have been subjectively coded by the authors on the basis of "the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive" [Jaggers and Gurr 1995, p. 471] .
Countries are rated on an 11-point scale from 0 to 10 (with higher values indicating greater democracy). I have rescaled the ratings to range from 0 to 1 for greater comparability with the Freedom House index.
The democracy measures deriving from the Freedom House and Polity III data sets are highly correlated. Across countries, the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.81 to 0.93 depending on the time period. The changes over time within countries also tend to be quite similar. However, due to the peculiarities of the ratings schemes used in the two sources, there is limited cross-country comparability across the two sources. Mexico, for example, receives a rating of 0.5 from Freedom House but a rating of 0.1 from Polity III. This has to be borne in mind in interpreting the estimated coefficients on these two indices in the regressions reported below.
Descriptive statistics for the wage and democracy indicators are shown in Table I 1985-1989 and 1990-1994, respectively for example Iraq, a country with a value of 0 in both democracy ratings. Going from the level of democracy in Iraq to that in the United States is associated with an increase in wages of 60 percent according to the regression using the Freedom House data (column 1), and an increase of 28 percent according to the regression using the Polity III data (column 2). Somewhat more realistically, moving from Mexico's democratic level to that of the United States is associated with an increase in wages of 30 percent (0.60x0.5) or 25 percent (0.28x0.9), depending on the regression used. We note that similar results hold for all cross-sections since 1975: the crosssectional relationship between democracy and wages (using either democracy measure) is statistically significant in all sub-periods from 1975-1979 through 1990-1994 (not shown).
The partial scatter plot shown in Figure I gives a visual sense of the results. We notice that countries with greater democratic freedoms than would be predicted on the basis of their income levels tend to have correspondingly high wages relative to productivity. India, Israel, Barbados, Mauritius, Malta, and Cyprus are some examples. Some of the countries at the other end of the spectrum-lower-than-expected values for the democracy index and low wages-are Iraq, Chile 10 , Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia.
The regressions reveal also that GDP per capita and the domestic price level (for consumer goods) enter the regressions with significant coefficients. 11 Even after controlling for labor productivity, we find that higher levels of GDP per capita and higher levels of consumer prices are associated with higher wages. One explanation for the role played by GDP per capita is that the finding reflects the tendency of the labor share in value added to be higher in richer countries. Note that the ratio of wages to MVA per worker is the factor share of labor in manufacturing (i.e., wL/pQ). The positive and statistically significant coefficient on GDP per worker-controlling for MVA per worker-indicates that this factor share rises systematically with the level of development. It is also possible that GDP per capita enters for reasons having to do with measurement error: if not all changes in productivity are captured in MVA, some will show up in the estimated coefficient on aggregate GDP.
As for the significant positive coefficient on the price level of consumption, we might be picking up the effect of bargaining on the determination wages. Under perfectly competitive labor markets, the price of the consumption basket would not exert an independent influence on the level of wages: wages would be set by equating the marginal product of labor to the real product wage. Workers care about real consumption wages, however, and this will be reflected in wages when bargaining plays a role. However, measurement error (this time in prices) may again be partly responsible.
Columns (3) and (4) check for robustness by including a number of additional regressors.
I try some variables that were used in Freeman's [1994] paper on national wage differentials:
schooling (measured by average years of education of total labor force), urbanization, and openness (measured by share of total trade in GDP). None of these enters significantly, which is not surprising since unlike Freeman [1994] I control for labor productivity directly. 12 When MVA per worker and per-capita GDP are dropped, all of these variables become significant if entered individually (at the 90 percent level or better). I also include a dummy for oil exporters, which enters with a negative sign (contrary to my expectations) but is again not significant. The estimated coefficients on democracy remain virtually unchanged and highly significant when the additional controls are introduced.
The final three columns of Table II show the results of two-stage least squares estimation, with the indices of democracy instrumented in various fashions. In column (5), I use a set of dummies pertaining to the colonial history of each country and a dummy for oil exporters as instruments for the Freedom House measure. 13 On the presumption that colonial history is relevant to the political-regime type but does not otherwise influence wages in a country, the colonial dummies identify countries that were British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, or other colonies. 14 The estimated coefficient on democracy is still highly significant, and actually larger.
This provides some indication that causality runs from democracy to wages levels.
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As an additional check on possible reverse causation, I have also regressed changes in democracy (over five-and ten-year horizons) on initial levels of wages, labor productivity and the other variables in the benchmark specification. The results (available on request) indicate that initial wages exert no effect on subsequent changes in democracy. In other words, there is no evidence in the data that countries with high wages (relative to productivity) are more likely to become democratic.
Since the two measures of democracy are likely to be "noisy" indicators of an underlying latent variable, it is also instructive to instrument each measure using the other. Columns (6) and (7) show the results of doing so. Both measures remain highly significant, and the estimated coefficient on the Polity III measure increases substantially (from 0.29 to 0.45).
countries (since there are no relevant observations), and also exclude the Latin America dummy (as Mexico is the only country in the sample that is from that region).
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Regardless of the sample size, which varies from 27 to 29 18 , the regressions with the BLS data yield highly significant coefficients on our democracy measures. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is significantly larger, ranging from 0.55 to 1.77. 19 The latter figure implies that Mexican wages would rise by almost 90 percent as a consequence of Mexico attaining the U.S. level of democracy! The higher estimates might be due to the particular set of countries covered by the BLS sample, or due to better data quality. The partial scatter plot between democracy and labor compensation in the BLS sample is shown in Figure II .
B. Panel results
The next question is whether the relationship between democracy and wages holds up in a panel setting, and in particular within countries over time. So in this section I pool time-series and cross-section data. I use five-year averages of the data covering a maximum of seven subperiods for each country, namely 1960-1964, 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, and 1990-1994 . This gives us a sample size that varies from 548 observations covering 104 countries (when using the Polity III data) to 106 observations covering 28 countries 17 Leaving the Latin America dummy in makes no difference to the results. 18 We lose one observation (Hong Kong) when we use the Polity III measure. In addition, MVA per worker is not available for all the 29 countries in the BLS sample.
19 A possible complication arising from the use of BLS hourly compensation data is that I control for value added per worker, not value added per hour. This leaves open the possibility that democracy works by reducing hours worked (and not just increasing wages). Indeed, democracy is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with statutory hours across countries, even after controlling for income levels and regional dummies.
(using the BLS sample). The panel is not balanced since not all countries have data for each of the sub-periods.
I show results for two types of regressions on the pooled data: OLS with period dummies and full fixed-effects (with dummies for both periods and countries). Note that the fixed-effects methodology is particularly demanding in this context, as it requires that the impact of democracy on wages be recovered from the relatively few time-series observations for individual countries.
But the fixed-effect estimation is useful in two important respects. First, it is particularly informative about the consequences of regime changes on wage levels within a given country.
Second, it eliminates country-specific idiosyncrasies in the WBLMDB/UNIDO data set regarding the type of coverage provided on wages and salaries.
Since wages and MVA/worker are both measured in current dollars, I run the regressions with the WBLMDB/UNIDO data also in a slightly different form to eliminate any spurious effects arising from wage and price inflation over time: I use as the dependent variable the ratio of wages to MVA/worker (which yields the factor share of labor in value added in manufacturing).
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The results are displayed in Tables IV and V Remarkably, all the fixed-effect estimates are significant at the 95 percent level or better also.
Even though there are no more than four observations per country in the BLS sample, the results using the BLS data are particularly powerful: the fixed-effect estimates with both democracy measures are significant at the 99 percent level (Table V) . In light of the limited number of time-series observations and the relatively small variation in democracy over time in most countries, it is striking that the results with the fixed-effect regressions are so strong. This constitutes quite persuasive evidence that the enhancement of democratic institutions is associated with higher wages for workers.
22
A closer look at the underlying data in the BLS sample reveals that the time-series evidence is driven by the experience of the following countries: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Korea, Taiwan C. Evidence from specific countries I next provide some event-study type evidence from countries that have gone through significant transformations in regime type. This kind of evidence can be particularly informative on the issue of causality. In all four cases of transition from democracy to authoritarian regimes, we find a dramatic fall in the factor share of labor. In six out of eight cases of transition to democracy we find an increase in the labor share. In some of these instances, the increase is quite dramatic: in Greece and Spain, the labor share increases by seven percentage points, and in Portugal by 18 points. On the whole, 10 out of the 12 cases listed here behave in the manner consistent with the econometric results. 23 The average reduction in the factor share of labor in the wake of transition to authoritarianism is a whopping 11 percentage points. The average increase in the factor share of labor when the political regime moves in the reverse direction is 4 percentage points. In both cases, the figures reveal that labor compensation has outstripped productivity between 1987 and the early 1990s, the period of transition to democracy. (Note that Figures III and IV combine labor compensation data from BLS with MVA/worker data from the WBLMDB/UNIDO data set.) The case of Korea is especially striking, as this country went from being a relatively low wage country (relative to its per-capita GDP) prior to democracy to one with high wages by the mid-1990s.
IV. WHY DOES DEMOCRACY MATTER TO WAGES?
Our findings indicate that democratic institutions tend to shift the functional distribution of income in manufacturing from profits to wages, or alternatively that authoritarian regimes transfer income from labor to employers. To anyone familiar with the recent economic history of Latin America, Southern Europe, or the Middle East, these results should not be counter-intuitive.
However, identifying the specific channels of causation is an interesting and important task that also deserves careful study. I make only a beginning here, by taking a first pass at the evidence.
The simplest way to understand how political institutions can influence wages (independently of labor productivity) is to think of wages as the outcome of a bargain struck by workers and employers. More concretely, think of how the enterprise surplus, itself determined by labor productivity, is split between labor compensation (w) and profits (π). Let the output price and the employment level both be normalized to unity, and let the surplus (which is also total and average labor productivity) be denoted by a. Profits are then given by π = a -w. Let the outside options for employers and employees be given by π * and w* (with the assumption that π * + w* < a). We can imagine that the outside options (or reservation wages) of workers are determined by employment opportunities in the public sector or in the informal sector, while the employers' alternatives are defined by exit opportunities in foreign countries. Finally, let the bargaining strengths of the two partners be described by (1-α) and α, for employers and employees respectively (1 < α < 0).
In a Nash-bargaining framework, we can characterize the outcome to this problem as the solution to the following: One can think, in particular, of four categories of reasons for why democracies might be friendly to labor. First, democracy may matter because democratic regimes are more likely to follow the rule of law. This may enhance the bargaining power of labor by enabling bureaucratic or judicial redress against employers. Second, democracies are less prone to political instability and discontinuity, and this too may work to workers' advantage by enhancing the outside options of employees (relative to those of employers). Third, democracies may directly enhance the bargaining power of labor by allowing greater freedom of association and of collective bargaining.
Finally, as the median-voter model would suggest, the process of political participation, competition, and contestation may increase the bargaining power and/or reservation wage of workers by producing a wide range of legislation and institutions that are more partial to workers' interests.
These are to some extent over-lapping reasons, and it may be too much to expect the data to deliver a clear verdict that sharply distinguishes among them. This caveat notwithstanding, the evidence seems to favor the last explanation over the others. It is the openness of the political system to competition and participation that seems to matter the most.
The results are summarized in Table VII . I use the benchmark regression from column (1) of Table II , and then add various proxies for the four categories of reasons listed above. I will focus on regressions with the WBLMDB/UNIDO data, but will also report some results with the smaller, BLS sample. The first column of Table VII reproduces the benchmark regression, for ease of comparison with subsequent results.
Columns (2)-(3) employ two indicators of the rule of law. The first of these is an index deriving from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and was first used in work by Knack and Keefer [1995] . 25 This index is based on evaluations by locally-based respondents on questions relating to the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, expropriation risk, and governmental repudiation of contracts. The other measure (bureaucratic efficiency) derives from a similar survey of the correspondents of Business International, and has been computed by Mauro [1995] . This index of is based on a simple average of ratings on the efficiency of the judiciary system, the extent of red tape, and the extent of corruption. Both indices range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater rule of law and superior bureaucratic institutions. As expected, these indices are highly correlated with measures of democracy (the correlation 25 My source for the ICRG data is Easterly and Levine [1997] , who average observations for the years 1980-1989. coefficients with the Freedom House measure are 0.67 and 0.58, respectively). Yet, as the results in Table VII reveal, neither of the rule-of-law indices enters near significant levels once democracy is already included. By contrast, the estimated coefficient on democracy remains statistically significant, and does not change much.
In column (4), I check for the effect of political instability. The measure I use (pinstab)
comes from Barro and Lee [1994] and is an equally weighted average of the number of assassinations (per million population per year) and the number of revolutions (per year). 26 It turns out that pinstab is virtually uncorrelated with either measure of democracy in this sample, and its inclusion in the regression makes very little difference. The estimated coefficient on democracy remains significant, while that on pinstab is insignificant.
Next, I check for the importance of labor-market institutions directly. I use two measures of labor rights: (a) the unionization rate, and (b) the number of conventions ratified by a country among the ILO's six basic workers' rights conventions. 27 The unionization and coverage rates come from the ILO [1998] and the ratifications measure from Rodrik [1996] . These measures are The results using the WBLMDB/UNIDO data do not yield significant coefficients on any of the measures of labor rights (columns 5 and 6). However, the results are much stronger in the smaller (but higher-quality) BLS sample (columns 7 and 8). The measure related to ILO ratifications is highly significant in this sample. The unionization rate barely misses significance at the 95 percent level. However, in all of these experiments, the estimated coefficients on democracy remain statistically significant (typically by a comfortable margin), and the magnitude of the coefficients changes very little (compared to the estimates reported in Table III) . 28 One interpretation of these findings is that our measures of democracy are better proxies for labor market institutions that enhance workers' rights than specific indicators of unionization, collective bargaining, or ratifications of ILO conventions.
Alternatively, democracy serves to raise wages in part through other channels than the freedom of association and collective bargaining. Competition among political parties and access by workers to political institutions can shape a whole range of legislation and institutions that determine labor-market outcomes. Rules on arbitration and on the hiring and firing of workers, minimum wages, provisions on social insurance and other benefits, the generosity of public-sector wages, and a myriad other public policies have a bearing on the general level of wages in a country because they affect the bargaining strength of labor and the value of outside options available to workers and employers. Political regimes that are more responsive to workers can be expected to yield more labor-friendly outcomes along such dimensions. Some indirect evidence in favor of this interpretation of our results is shown in columns (9)-(11).
First, I exploit the fact that the Freedom House index is an equally-weighted average of two sub-indices, one pertaining to political rights and the other to civil liberties. The former 27 The ILO conventions included are those on forced labor, freedom of association, right to organize and collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, non-discrimination, and minimum age of work (Conventions 29, 87, 98, 105, 111 , and 138 respectively).
28 I have also experimented with the collective bargaining coverage rate, defined as the proportion of formal-sector employees covered by collective agreements. This measure enters significantly in the BLS sample (and with a positive coefficient). But the coefficient on democracy remains unaffected once again. We note that the impact of the added controls on the estimated coefficient on democracy is clouded somewhat by the fact that the sample sizes keep changing. However, these controls do not affect the democracy variable even when run on identical samples.
refers to the rights to vote, to compete for public office, and to have elected representatives with a decisive say in policy making, while the latter refer to rights of free speech and free association.
Note, in particular, that the Freedom House checklist for civil liberties includes specific questions on the presence of free trade unions, effectiveness of collective bargaining, and freedom from exploitation by employees. Hence, of the two components, it is civil liberties that gauge specific labor rights, while political rights measure the degree of competitiveness of the political system. the democracy index, presumably because of the exclusion of blacks, in the former case, and lower-caste groups, in the latter, from the political process. Mexico is rated relatively higher on competitiveness of political participation, presumably because of the extent of popular mobilization despite an effectively one-party system.
One can only draw tentative conclusions from all this. But the data seem to suggest that this paper's central finding on the relationship between democracy and wages is a consequence of political competition and political participation at large, rather than of the rule of law, political stability, civil liberties, or specific labor rights.
Finally, it should be noted that there could be other, non-bargaining channels through which political participation influences labor's share of manufacturing product. For example, democratic regimes may be more consumer-oriented and encourage greater product-market competition than authoritarian regimes that tend to favor a narrow set of producer interests ("cronies"). If so, mark-ups will be higher under authoritarian regimes, and the labor share of total product lower. Alternatively, non-democratic societies may erect greater restrictions on labor mobility, thereby enhancing the monopsony power of employers. Testing for these and other hypotheses will require a combination of detailed case studies and more finely-tuned crossnational data sets than are available at present.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Institutions matter to distributive outcomes. The results in this paper strongly suggest that democratic institutions tend to be friendly to labor: they are associated with higher wages and a larger factor share for labor in manufacturing. This is perhaps not entirely unexpected. What is more surprising is that the effects show up so strongly in the data.
There are a number of research avenues opened up by these results. First, it would be desirable to sort out some of the causality issues in greater detail. Is there perhaps a two-way relationship between wages and democracy, with a larger middle class sustained by relatively high wages rendering democracy more likely and more durable? What are the specific policy outcomes through which political participation and contestation lead to higher labor compensation?
Second, bearing in mind that our findings pertain to manufacturing alone, it would be Finally, what are the economic consequences of the regularity identified here? How do employers and owners of capital respond to the higher level of wages fostered by democracy?
One hypothesis is that democracies allow more efficient bargains by removing the impediments that authoritarian regimes install so as to repress wages. A competing hypothesis would be that democracies introduce inefficiencies in order to raise wages. Note that there is little evidence that democracy is negatively associated with long-run economic performance; if anything, the reverse seems to be true [Rodrik 1997 ]. This would tend to favor the first hypothesis.
Alternatively, it could be that democracy provides other advantages-such as more secure property rights and greater political stability-that offset the cost of high wages.
APPENDIX A. Sources and methods
The U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) provides annual data on average "wages and salaries" per employee and value added per worker in manufacturing for a large sample of countries. 31 My source for this data is the World Bank's Labor Market Data Base (WBLMDB, Rama [1996] ), where the original UNIDO data are collated. Martin Rama kindly made the data available. I converted the WBLMDB/UNIDO data on wages and MVA/worker to U.S. dollars using contemporaneous exchange rates from the World Bank's World Data 1995 and from national sources (for Taiwan). The factor shares of labor in manufacturing value added were calculated by dividing average labor costs with MVA per employee, and do not depend on the exchange rate used. Five-year averages were calculated by using all available annual observations within the relevant period. The sample is restricted to the 138 countries for which Barro and Lee [1994] provide comparative data.
The BLS data on hourly compensation for production workers in manufacturing (in U.S. Barro and Lee [1994] . Unlike MVA/worker, which is converted at current (contemporaneous) market exchange rates, the GDP/capita data are in purchasing-power-adjusted terms. Openness comes from the Penn World Tables, via Barro and Lee [1994] , and schooling from Barro and Lee [1994] . Urbanization is from World Bank's World Data 1995.
B. Cross-national comparability in the WBLMDB/UNIDO data set and robustness checks 33
As mentioned in the text, there are some problems in the cross-national comparability of the wage data originating from the WBLMDB/UNIDO source. Two basic definitions are used in this source. Wages and salaries include all payments in cash or in kind made to "employees"
during the reference year in relation to work done for the establishment. These payments include:
• direct wages and salaries;
• remuneration for time not worked;
• bonuses and gratuities;
• housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer;
• payments in kind.
Compensation of employees is equivalent to wages and salaries plus employers' contributions on behalf of their employees paid to social security, pension and insurance schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees under these schemes and severance and termination pay.
The majority of the countries claim to report wages and salaries as defined above. A large group of countries report compensation of employees. Only a handful of countries (mostly OECD economies) give detailed descriptions of what is included in wages and salaries different from either of the two blanket categories. Some countries differ in coverage (whether home workers are included, whether labor contractors are included, and so on). Some (South Africa, Hong Kong, India, and the UK) explicitly state that they do not include payments in cash. Peru does not include bonuses; the Netherlands excludes sick leave compensation.
To the extent that country notes allow meaningful distinctions, the most common categories seem to be the following:
1. Wages and salaries 2. Wages and salaries plus employers' contributions to social security 3. Wages and salaries plus severance pay 4. Compensation of employees.
I created a set of dummies for each country, identifying which (if any) of these categories it belongs.
A few countries are difficult to classify. South Africa includes some employers' contributions to pension, holiday and medical aid funds, but excludes their contributions for unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation. (In checking for robustness, South
Africa was put alternatively in category 1 and then 2). Israel covers "all payments appearing on the pay-roll on which income tax is due." It is classified as 1. In Turkey wages and salaries relate to "gross payments made for work done, including bonuses, social security and pension fund premium, and payments in kind." Assuming that the "premium" is paid by the employers, Turkey is classified as 2. Finland claims to report compensation of employees, but the detailed description fails to mention severance payments. Malta explicitly excludes employees' insurance contributions but includes those by employers. Hungary excludes gratuities, certain subsidies, family allowances, and housing allowances. Finally, UNIDO yearbooks provide no information on a number of countries, and these have been classified as missing for the purpose of coding of wage coverage.
In terms of variation in statistical procedures within countries over time, there appear to be some minor changes once in a while, but mostly countries stick to their reporting conventions.
A selective check reveals no significant revision of the definitions in any country over the period covered.
The coverage dummies constructed in the fashion discussed above were introduced in both the cross-section and panel regressions (with the exception of the fixed-effects regression where doing so would be redundant). The goal was to see if there were any biases originating from differences in countries' reporting of wages. In all but two of the cases, the estimated coefficients on the democracy measures were hardly affected, while their level of significance remained unchanged. In two instances (the random-effects regressions using the Freedom House measure), the coefficients on democracy were reduced somewhat and their significance dropped to 95 percent (from 99 percent). But these were the result of reductions in sample size due to missing wage coverage codes for a number of countries, rather than the introduction of the dummies itself. The coverage dummies themselves were rarely statistically significant. These results are available upon request. Regressions include a constant term and dummies for East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, socialist countries, and OECD members (coefficent estimates not shown). In columns (3) and (4) missing observations for schooling and urbanization have been assigned a value of zero; these regressions include two dummy variables indicating missing data for these two variables.
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A set of colonial dummies and an oil exporter dummy are used as instruments in column (5). The Polity III and Freedom House indices are used as instruments for each other in columns (6) and (7). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 99 percent; ** 95 percent; *** 90 percent. Estimated using five-year averages covering 1960-1964, 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, and 1990-1994 . Regressions using Freedom House index do not cover 1960-1964 and 1965-1969 . OLS regressions include a constant term and dummies for East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, socialist countries, and OECD members (coefficent estimates not shown). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for OLS regressions. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 99 percent; ** 95 percent; *** 90 percent. Estimated using four five-year averages covering 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, and 1990-1994 . OLS regressions include a constant term and dummies for East Asia and OECD members (coefficent estimates not shown). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (1) and (3). Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 99 percent; ** 95 percent; *** 90 percent. The factor share of labor refers to the ratio of average wages and salaries to MVA per worker, or the wage bill divided by value added in manufacturing. Pre-and post-values are calculated using up to three observations prior to and following the year of transition indicated. [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] and include a constant term, log MVA per worker, log per-capita GDP, log price level and dummies for East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, socialist countries, and OECD members (coefficent estimates not shown). Regressions in columns (8) 
